The second factor is the population density of the acquired territory. The natural log of the calculated density was used to create the variable density , thereby adjusting its diminishing marginal effect. Observations from cases in which no territorial change occurred were assigned a value of 0. The analyses also considered the following covariates. Related to territory, variables that represent the geographic proximity of adversaries and the issue at stake were included.
The binary variable, contiguity , is coded 1 if adversaries are contiguous by land or separated by less than miles of water. Because territory is one of the essential elements of a sovereign state, conflicts over existence necessarily involve territorial disagreements. This variable was also derived by Fortna from the ICB dataset. In addition to these factors, the strength of ceasefire agreements was included, following Fortna , who argued that a strong formal agreement contributes to durable peace.
Fortna represented the strength of agreements using the agreement strength index, a composite measurement adding the following 10 factors: formal acceptance of a ceasefire proposal; withdrawal of military forces to status ante ; formation of demilitarized zones; agreement on arms control procedure; involvement of peacekeeping forces; strength of enforcement measures by third-party involvement; strength of internal enforcement effort; number of paragraphs in the agreement text; agreement on confidence-building measures; and the level of dispute-resolution efforts.
Following Werner and Yuen , battle consistency and interrupted war were also incorporated into the analysis. The variable is then obtained by taking the difference between the growth rates of the adversaries. Furthermore, a military tie was coded as 1 when a war ended in a tie and as 0 if otherwise. The cost of war was measured by the natural log of the total number of battle deaths. These three variables were retrieved from the dataset provided by Fortna Agreement strength might change over time if follow-up agreements are reached.
Ceasefire duration was examined through duration analysis to enable proper treatment of the right-censored processes.
The Imperial Japanese Navy in the Pacific War by Mark Stille
The current study employed the Weibull model, assuming that the baseline probability of war resumption monotonically changes over time. The same analyses using the Cox model were run here to reduce the risk of arriving at a conclusion sensitive to assumptions about the shape of the baseline hazard, although a residual analysis suggests that the Weibull model better fits the data.
Corresponding results are reported in the Supplementary Material. The results of the analysis are reported in the form of coefficients that show the marginal effects of variables on the hazard function, that is, the instantaneous probability of failure at a certain point in time conditional on survival up to that point. A factor with a negative coefficient decreases the instantaneous probability of ceasefire breakdown and thus extends its duration. For substantive interpretation, the hazard ratio is also reported: the instantaneous probability of ceasefire failure increases by the factor of the ratio, given survival up to that point.
Predictors of the hazard ratio exceeding a value of 1 thus increase the likelihood of war resumption. Model 1 examines the effect of territorial acquisition by controlling for factors such as the characteristics of war, the form of ceasefire agreements, and post-war shifts in the balance of power.
Territorial acquisition is found to have a disturbing effect on ceasefire duration. When one or both adversaries acquire new territory through war, a succeeding ceasefire, when achieved, faces a higher risk of failure. The effect of territorial change is robust across different models and model specifications, as is discussed later and in the Supplementary Material. In all models, territorial acquisition decreases ceasefire duration. The effect of territorial acquisition remains consistent even when these factors are controlled for, that is, territorial change results in shorter ceasefires regardless of adversaries being contiguous or of existential and territorial issues at stake.
Moreover, in Models 1 and 2, the effect of territorial acquisition is observed with controlling for post-war shifts in relative capabilities. According to the results of Model 2, among variables relating to territories, the geographical contiguity of adversaries does not affect ceasefire durability in a significant manner.
Japanese Perspective on the War in Pacific (Visual Statistics Illustrated)
On the other hand, ceasefires are maintained for a longer period if their territorial integrity, but not existence, is challenged. The contrasting effects of these variables suggest that the more contentious the issue at stake is, the more likely the adversaries are to return to war. Additionally, interrupted wars are found to be associated with shorter ceasefires and wars with consistent battle outcomes tend to be followed by a more durable peace, as Werner and Yuen demonstrated.
However, the analysis presented here is unable to determine whether third parties caused unstable ceasefires or whether particularly unstable ceasefires attracted third-party intervention. Moreover, consistent with Werner , the post-war change in relative capabilities increases the risk of ceasefire breakdown. Furthermore, the greater the cost of the preceding war, the more durable the subsequent ceasefire, which is consistent across all model specifications. It shows that the occurrence of territorial acquisition considerably increases the probability of war resumption. Moreover, the resumption of war appears more likely when existence is at stake, showing the estimated hazard ratio of However, from a substantive point of view, the existential issue might have only a moderate effect on ceasefire duration, taking into account its large standard error.
The influence of a shift in relative capabilities appears moderate, considering that a one-unit increase of the variable signifies a very large shift in the balance of power such that the power of one side is doubled in a span of one year. Effects on the likelihood of war resumption. The scale of the horizontal axis is adjusted so that the behavior of all variables is substantively and intuitively understandable. Curtailed parts are denoted by vertical double lines. Looking at the left side of the figure, territory at stake and battle consistency greatly contribute to stable ceasefire outcomes.
In other words, war is less likely to resume if it was fought over issues of territorial integration, annexation, and separatism, but not the existence of country. Adversaries are also less likely to return to war if they are able to infer their balance of power accurately from consistent battle outcomes of the preceding wars. The cost of war also has a non-negligible effect. To give an example of substantive interpretation, the figure shows the effect of the variable when the total number of battle deaths increases from 2, to 8, Hypotheses 2a and 2b are then examined to analyze how the effects of territorial acquisition vary depending on the characteristics of territorial change.
Consistent with the hypothesis, ceasefire breakdown is positively related to the size of the area exchanged between adversaries.
The hazard ratio for area is 1. To give an example, a one-unit increase in area is roughly equivalent to the difference between the Golan Heights 7. Considering that the observed value of area ranges from 5. The result shows that ceasefires are less durable when there is an exchange of more densely populated territory.
In cases involving territorial change, the observed value of density varies from 2. For instance, the density of the Golan Heights was 3. Hence, the hazard ratio of 1. Next, a graphical representation in Fig. The plots report the estimated hazard function the left column and the estimated survivor function the right column for three scenarios: ceasefires following i no territorial acquisition, ii acquisition of territories with average density, and iii acquisition of territories with the highest density recorded in the dataset.
According to the illustrations, supposing that 10 years 3, days have passed since the war terminated without any territorial change, the likelihood of the ceasefire enduring until then is slightly higher than one following the acquisition of most densely populated territories. After 20 years 7, days , the possibility of a ceasefire preceded by the transfer of most densely populated territories remaining intact is much smaller than one involving no territorial change.
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Estimated hazard function and survivor function for density. All other variables are held at their mean values. The first part of the analysis demonstrates that territorial acquisition increases the likelihood of war resumption and that this effect is not attributed to the contiguity of adversaries, the importance of territorial issues, and the actual shift in relative capabilities. Potential concerns with the above analysis would be that the results depend on methodological assumptions and influential observations in the dataset.
To address the first concern, the same analyses are run using the Cox model. A series of robustness checks are also conducted to control for the effect of possible outliers and influential observations, such as the Sinai War between Israel and Egypt and the First Turco-Cypriot War. The results remain unchanged, and are reported in the Supplementary Material. In other words, the seizure of large and densely populated territories through war causes less durable ceasefires. An alternative interpretation of the results may be that governing the local population inhabiting a newly acquired territory is more difficult than occupying an underpopulated land.
More heavily populated territories are thus more difficult to secure control over and are more susceptible to war resumption. Although this study alone cannot reject this possibility, this alternative argument serves as a limited account of failed ceasefires, considering that they are not durable when democratic countries are victorious. This statistical analysis illuminates the links between territorial acquisition, a commitment problem, and war recurrence. The next section applies this argument to cases in the Asia and Pacific region: the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts over the land border and in the South China Sea.
The analysis also complements the statistical analysis, demonstrating that the patterns of their conflicts were affected by the utility of the seized territories in each region. Although both countries uphold a communist ideology, this commonality has not implied shared interests even during the Cold War. Their disputes are most intensely militarized along their land border, over which they fought two full-scale wars in and They have also engaged in less intensified and sporadic militarized disputes over the South China Sea, where armed clashes have happened in and , and then frequently since Without doubt, the ceasefires between and the late s at land and sea greatly differ in terms of the intensity of military actions wars on land and militarized disputes at sea and are not readily comparable.
However, contrasting them will shed light on the above-mentioned dynamics while holding other factors, such as the presence of the Soviet Union and the ongoing civil war in Cambodia, constant. Historical accounts disagree on who won the war. The war imposed considerable costs on both sides; more than 50, soldiers lost their lives and , people were killed in the war, although contradictory figures are provided by various sources Hood, , p.
Although Beijing and Hanoi initiated peace negotiations immediately after the war, fighting along the border resumed soon after. By early , the number of violent incidents committed by the Chinese allegedly exceeded 4, cases, and China accused Vietnam of instigating more than 2, armed provocations and the killing of Chinese Chang, , pp. The fighting culminated in January through a conflict referred to as the Second Sino-Vietnamese War. Confrontations lasted until March , resulting in as many as 3,, mostly Chinese, fatalities Bercovitch and Jackson, , p. The dispute over the South China Sea contrasts with the failed ceasefire over the land border.
The first confrontation at sea occurred between China and South Vietnam in when China seized the entire Paracel Islands, and South Vietnam in turn occupied part of the Spratly Islands.
Fighting was limited in intensity and no significant military confrontation was reported in the South China Sea until Stability broke down in , when a Chinese naval vessel attacked a Vietnamese gunboat near the Spratly Islands, resulting in more than 70 casualties. Thus, the ceasefire terminating the First Sino-Vietnamese War failed quickly, whereas stability was preserved after the armed clash over the South China Sea.
Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the South China Sea incident did not escalate or recur as opposed to that over the land border. This contrast is even more intriguing considering that a costly and uninterrupted war is commonly considered less prone to recurrence. This study focuses on the utility of seized territories at land and sea. During confrontations along the land border, no large territorial change was reported 4 ; however, China and Vietnam exchanged small but important territories: strategically situated hills along the border.
The main stakes in the South China Sea were underwater oil and mineral reserves. This ambition for oil and minerals was fueled by the global trend of setting exclusive economic zones EEZs to include maritime resources. Therefore, China and Vietnam exchanged two vital territories: strategically located hills and islands containing maritime resources. Although they did not exchange industrial cities as posed in the theoretical argument, the two territories had different implications for future power shifts during the period between and as described in the theory: strategically located hills had greater utility in terms of stimulating power shifts than maritime resources, which both China and Vietnam lacked the capacity to exploit.
The value of these hills was readily consumable by both countries that could improve their military position by simply consolidating their control over the hills Carter, The vitality of these hills was compounded by the underdeveloped economic and military capabilities of the adversaries. Its economic and military capacities mostly depended on assistance from the Soviet Union Hood, , p. In China, similarly, the economy and society, at large, were devastated by the Cultural Revolution.
Although conditions began to change in when Deng Xiaoping took leadership and applied economic reforms, more than half the population still lived below the poverty line as reported in Ravallion and Chen, In contrast to the hills, both China and Vietnam lacked capacities to exploit offshore oil fields in the deep waters of the South China Sea.
China was only able to exploit offshore oil from the shallow waters of the Gulf of Tonkin Lo, , pp. However, by the early s, their activities were still limited to shallow sea areas in the Tonkin Gulf and off the coast of Hainan Island Lo, , p.
By the end of , China had extended its focus to the South China Sea and installed oil rigs there. Nevertheless, it was not able to initiate actual oil production, even in the Gulf, until Hood, , p. Similarly, Vietnam suffered from lack of technological capabilities to extract maritime resources. Interestingly, in contrast to the stability of the South China Sea, a couple of incidents occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin during this period.
In fact, 14 armed Vietnamese boats clashed with Chinese fishing trawlers in the Gulf in Similarly, in , two Chinese fishing boats operating in the Gulf were attacked by Vietnamese forces Chang, , pp. Hence, the above illustrations suggest that territorial acquisition and the utility of seized territories explain the dynamics of the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts occurring between and the late s.
The duration analysis of ceasefires following wars occurring between and shows that territorial acquisition renders likely resumption of war. Moreover, some types of territorial acquisition pose a more serious commitment problem than others based on the characteristics of the transferred territory: the size and the population density. In short, territorial acquisition that would likely produce a larger future shift in power was demonstrated to be significantly more detrimental to lasting ceasefire. The findings presented here thus contribute to the literature on recurrent war in several respects.
First, although disputes over territory have been especially conflictual, the effect of territorial acquisition on recurrent war has been insufficiently studied in the literature. This study filled the gap, demonstrating that territorial acquisition has detrimental effects on post-war peace. Moreover, this study also found that the negative effect of territorial acquisition is not completely attributed to the contiguity of adversaries or the vitality of territorial issues.
Another explanation, therefore, was offered. Territorial acquisition generates a commitment problem, which obstructs peaceful renegotiation of ceasefires and causes recurrent war. The study also showed that the effect of territorial acquisition varies depending on the utility of the acquired territory.
These findings are somewhat contradictory to intuition-based results. The common belief is that a decisive victory contributes to post-war peace.
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However, if the size of a victory is defined by the volume of the seized territories as opposed to military outcomes, a significant victory may not lead to post-war peace. The implications of this research extend to current incidents between China and Vietnam over the South China Sea. After several years of peace since , controversy reemerged in when Chinese forces arrested nine fishermen accused of carrying explosives close to the Paracel Islands The Associated Press, This event has been followed by several militarized incidents that were apparently motivated by a desire for maritime resources.
Although these incidents are similar to those occurring during the s and s, they have become more frequent than before. Viewed in the framework of this study, this increase in the number of armed clashes over the South China Sea is possibly affected by the economic and technological development of both countries in exploiting maritime resources in deep water areas.
It is not argued that the mechanism identified in the current study serves as the sole and complete explanation of the Sino-Vietnamese rivalry to date. Rather, it sheds light on the dynamics of their rivalry revolving around issues of territorial acquisition and their economic development, hoping to advance our understanding of their ongoing dispute and to find a way to prevent it from further escalating.
The author also thanks Virginia Page Fortna for making her dataset available online. Special acknowledgement goes to Daichi Yamada for his research assistance. Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide.
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